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Abstract
In 2007, after years of unresolved debate, the Swedish parliament approved a congestion charge for Stockholm applied to
cars crossing the city’s inner boundary. Since its introduction, congestion charging has led to an even more lasting reduc-
tion of car trips to the city center, in part because the policy generates revenues for financing new subway extensions and
uses these same resources as the basis for negotiating new transit oriented housing in subway extension areas. As such,
congestion charging is arguably as much a sustainable housing solution as it is a narrowly defined transit policy for reduc-
ing automobile congestion or pollution. This article investigates how and why Stockholm, despite considerable political
conflict, technical complexity and negative public opinion, was able to turn a long-standing and controversial debate over
moderating automobile traffic via tolls into widespread support for a national congestion tax, which itself laid the ground-
work for a more expansive sustainability agenda. It further suggests that only when congestion charging was strategically
reframed and widely recognized as addressing the concerns of multiple and competing constituencies, did efforts for its
adoption translate into larger sustainability gains.
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1. Introduction
In June 2007, Stockholm introduced a congestion charge
for vehicles crossing the city’s inner boundary to reduce
traffic flows into central city areas and fund badly needed
new capital investments. The decision followed a seven-
month trial and a public referendum. Today, Stockholm
is known world-wide for the successes of its congestion-
charging programand its early adoption of a policywhich
has contributed to its reputation as one of the most sus-
tainable cities in Europe. Congestion charging is now ac-
cepted by a broad group of stakeholders, including those
who ardently fought the introduction of such measures
for close to forty years. Moreover, the revenue gener-
ated by the charge is now funding subway extensions
by negotiating with local communities, who in return
for these investments in infrastructure agree to provide
transit oriented new housing. Thus, congestion charging
has increased local authorities’ political capacity to link
housing and transportation planning to support sustain-
able growth.
This case study investigates how, why, and in what
ways governing authorities in Stockholm reversed four
decades of opposition to congestion charging, bringing
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Green Party advocates, Moderate, Social Democratic,
and Liberal Party protagonists together to support this
policy despite years of political conflict, considerable
technical complexity, and initially negative public opin-
ion. The narrative presented here is based on a review of
historical documents, plans and reports, complementary
date on historical population and income trends, and in-
terviews with leading politicians, civil servants and NGO
representatives, both active and retired. Of 21 total inter-
views, 14were undertaken in 2014 based on an interview
guide. Other individuals were interviewed as part of the
process of determining relevant transportation decisions.
During a return visit in 2015 nine additional interviews
were conducted, several new actors were interviewed,
and some additional contacts were re-interviewed (a full
list is available upon request).
In this article we investigate the historical evolution
of political support for and against congestion charging
in the context of institutional relationships at the munic-
ipal, regional and national levels. Our aim is neither to
evaluate the transit implications of congestion charging
nor offer a new interpretation of the operation of the
trial experiment that led up to the public referendumand
its electoral success, two topics already well addressed
in the literature (Eliasson, Hultkrantz, & Rosqvist, 2014;
Gullberg & Isaksson, 2009). Rather, we are interested in
the temporal and strategic process through which the
policy was ultimately recast as contributing tomore than
transit priorities, as well as what role planners, politi-
cians, and even the private sector played in crafting a re-
framing which effectively linked congestion charging to
other urban challenges such as housing and environmen-
tal protection.
Recent work in the transport field has investigated
the intra- and inter-bureaucratic conversations that pro-
duce policy change within institutions and in particular a
shift in focus from transit to mobility. For instance, Hull
(2007) explores the organizational and institutional di-
mensions of policy change and how they are marshaled
to produce more sustainable transport policy. Battilana,
Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009) have likewise argued that
“institutional entrepreneurship” is key to changing the
policy mandates within governing institutions. Along the
same lines, the international NGO responsible for much
of the policy agenda setting in the field of transport, ITDP
(International Transport andDevelopment Policy), has re-
cently enshrined a similar rhetorical shift by turning at-
tention away from mobility and more towards access.
We build on this thread in the literature but also
move beyond it. In addition to expanding our under-
standing of congestion charging as having urban sustain-
ability implications beyond mobility because of its im-
pact on land-use, we examine theways in which a negoti-
ated reframing of the benefits of congestion charging by
stakeholders both outside and inside bureaucratic insti-
tutions and across various political parties has played a
critical role in effectively recasting the housing-transport
nexus. All this leads us to suggest that the analysis and
evaluation of congestion charging must be understood
not merely in terms of its mobility impacts but also in
the context of larger, more politically and strategically co-
ordinated infrastructural imperatives necessary for pro-
ducing sustainable cities.1 Furthermore, by showing that
the reframing of congestion charging involved both na-
tional and city leaders and their constituencies, a fact
reinforced by the designation of congestion charging as
a national tax, we are able to move beyond the biases
in much of the policy analysis literature—transport or
otherwise—that assumes that the jurisdictional domains
of policymaking are either local or national. In this in-
stance,2 it was the shared responsibility across gover-
nance scales that set into motion an alternative framing
of the value of congestion charging, and that ultimately
led to its more expanded and transformative impacts
with respect to urban sustainability.
2. Background: The Swedish and Stockholm Context
Sweden is a Western parliamentary multiparty democ-
racy, with universal suffrage and elections at the na-
tional, regional and municipal levels on the same day ev-
ery four years. It is often said that Swedish voters choose
a party rather than an individual candidate, though dy-
namic and charismatic politicians have boosted politi-
cal parties in Sweden as elsewhere. In contrast to na-
tions with presidential rule and/or Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tions, Swedish politics reflects collective decision-making
at all levels; leading Swedish decision-makers to not have
the status of say the governor of a US state or the Mayor
of London. Accordingly, the decisions described in this
case were made by the 101-member Stockholm City
Council, the county council assembly and the national
parliament. The congestion charge decision in 2006 was
a national level tax which required a formal decision of
the Swedish parliament.
Many associate the Swedish brand of social welfare
policy with the long period of Social Democratic Party-
led government for several decades starting in the mid
1920’s. In fact, in Stockholm the balance of power be-
tween the left and right party blocks has shifted back
and forth several times. However, shifts between gov-
erning coalitions have in general not paralyzed efforts
to adopt new policies and implement major new invest-
ments. Part of the reason for this may be that the pe-
1 For more on the importance of conceiving of integrated urban infrastructures as the key to building sustainable cities, see Bonilla and Zapparoli (2017).
2 In an article by Brian Holland (2015, p. 125), the argument is made that scholarly research on policy design rarely “reflect(s) a discussion of the impact
of where programs or initiatives are implemented,” and that only institutional analysis will yield possible answers to the “where” question. He further
argues the importance of understanding the reasons why different scales of governmentmight prioritize people versus place, economic versus social, or
publicly versus privately led dimensions of policy. Such claims are interesting for our analysis here, because a reframing of congestion charging through
local and national collaboration allowed a discussion of all of these dimensions simultaneously.
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riod between about 1930 and the mid 1960’s was one
in which there was consensus between the Social Demo-
cratic Party and the Liberal party regarding priorities
for social welfare achieved through the redevelopment
of the built environment based on modernist and func-
tionalist principles. Another explanation for Stockholm’s
ability to achieve transformative urban development de-
spite differences in political opinion may be the Swedish
culture of compromise. Although this is often equated
with cultural values favoring consensus, it may be more
closely linked to a pragmatic approach to political deci-
sion making.
Both functionalism and pragmatism contributed to
a Swedish approach to urban development that during
certain historical periods has seen transportation and
land use for housing and commercial use as intertwined.
It was also reinforced by institutions such as multiparty
andmulti-sector national evaluations and committees at
both the national level and in Stockholm (and later, at
the metropolitan level). The national evaluations and lo-
cal and regional plans analyzed for this study all reflect
an understanding of functional links among geographies
and sectors and are typically the joint responsibility of
politicians, civil servants and experts in planning, trans-
port, real estate, public works and finance.
Stockholm’s extensive and high quality public tran-
sit system, including the metro (tunnelbana) built and
extended since the 1940’s, emerged from precisely this
logic. Since its construction, the subway has contributed
to a high share of public transport trips even before the
congestion charge was introduced; currently over 70 per-
cent of all tripswithin the city, 60–65 percent to and from
the city centre and about 35 percent of trips within the
region as a whole, suggest a high share of transit in to-
tal trips by international standards (for current statistics
from the City of Stockholm see Stockholms Stad, 2016).
As a consequence of the various driving forces influ-
encing land-use, the population of the inner city started
falling in the 1940´s and the population of the city in the
1960´s. The fraction of Stockholm´s population living in
the inner city fell from 78 to 35 percent between 1940
and 1980 and the fraction living in the city, decreased
from 67 per cent in 1950 to 42 percent in 1980 where-
upon the ratio stabilized. In 2017 slightly more than 41
percent of the region’s population lived within the City
of Stockholm (Statistics Sweden, 2017).
The expansion of the subway system offered supe-
rior, low cost accessibility to a much larger geographic
area and as such greatly increased the size and spread of
the functional metropolitan region (Börjesson, Jonsson,
& Lundberg, 2013). In Stockholm this tendency was ar-
guably reinforced by policies that provided families of av-
erage income with larger dwellings of a higher standard
while simultaneously safe-guarding the inner city from
high-rise apartment blocks (see Gullberg & Kaijser, 2004;
Malmsten & Carle, 2007; Sidenbladh, 1981).
3. Congestion Charging in Stockholm
Against this backdrop, the introduction of congestion
charging both revealed some of the same financial dilem-
mas and political tensions that marked early debate over
the expansion of the subway system, even as it con-
nected the fate of congestion charging to yet another
politically contentious transportation conflict emerging
in later decades: what to do about growing automobile
expansion. The sections that follow describe the deci-
sion to introduce congestion charges in Stockholm in
light of these historically specific dilemmas; first as a
means of expanding an original proposal for toll roads;
second as a full-scale experiment (decision 2002; trial
2005–2006) intended to reduce automobile traffic and
enhance the use of public transportation, including the
subway; and finally as a permanent national tax (deci-
sion 2007; extended 2013) that laid the foundation for
connecting transport to urban land-use in ways not that
dissimilar from decades earlier discussions surrounding
the subway.
3.1. Precedents and Forerunners
Road charges—not congestion charges—had been dis-
cussed for years and were thoroughly analyzed and pro-
posed in national reviews of metropolitan policy in the
late 1980’s (Swedish Government Official Reports SOU
1989:67–70, SOU 1989:109–112, SOU 1990:20 and SOU
1990:32–36). When the national government opened
negotiations with the leading political parties at the lo-
cal and regional authorities in the Stockholm region for
a comprehensive investment package in road and rail,
road tolls were formally introduced.3 Several of the par-
ties participating in the first round of negotiations were
positive to the idea of road charges (Social Democrats,
Liberals, Green Party, Stockholm Party, Center Party)
but the powerful Moderate Party was firmly against the
charges unless they were earmarked for new roads. In
Spring 1992 the majority parties remaining in the nego-
tiation leading to the so-called Dennis Agreement (So-
cial Democrats, Moderates, Liberals) said yes to the road
charges, contingent on the idea that the revenue would
be used exclusively to fund the new roads. “One rea-
son for that themoderates’ hesitancy was overcomewas
surely that they did not see any alternative to financing
the road projects they most prized.” (Malmsten & Carle,
2007, p. 55, author’s translation). Although this was a
road toll and not a congestion charge per se, the effect
of a new toll to reduce total vehicle miles travelled and
to achieve a better spread of traffic to avoid congestion
peaks was discussed early on.
When the national government tore up the Dennis
Agreement in 1997, plans to introduce road charges in
Stockholm were once again tabled. Yet interest in road
charges and congestion charges remained. During the
3 This negotiation is popularly known as the Dennis negotiations, named for national negotiator Bengt Dennis.
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15 years from the late 1990’s Sweden noticed interna-
tional experiments with charges in Oslo, Singapore and
London which were cited by many of those interviewed
as important predecessors to Stockholm’s experience
that gave the idea legitimacy in political circles and, even-
tually, for the population as a whole. Foreign examples
affected public opinion, but also helped individual lead-
ers hone their strategies. Åsa Romson of the Green Party
notes that a study trip to Edinburgh during this period
was influential; she realized that road charges had only
been understood by the public as an economic burden
and this prompted her to think about how to communi-
cate the benefits of improved accessibility and economic
savings (from e. g. not needing more road space) (inter-
view, May 28, 2014). The Dennis Agreement describes
road charges to finance the unbuilt sections of the Ring
and for the outer bypass (Västerleden).4 This had always
been an uneasy and brittle compromise since the Mod-
erates were basically against road charges in all forms,
the Social Democrats were against the eastern section
of the Ring and the Liberals were against the outer by-
pass. Sowhen the national governmentwithdrew its sup-
port for the package, all bets were off. Yet ten years
later a fairly advanced congestion charging tax had been
made permanent and by all accounts has received broad
(if grudging) acceptance from awide range of constituen-
cies. How this happened a lot to do with a changed polit-
ical context in the early 2000’s.
3.2. The 2002 Elections
During the 2002 election campaign, the environmental
lobby had become more organized and was able to high-
light the role of road charges in reducing congestion, im-
proving local air quality, reducing carbon emissions, and
potentially avoiding the cost and effort to build a west-
ern bypass (whose estimated budget increased with ev-
ery new evaluation and showed no signs of plateauing).
On the other hand, there was still considerable support
for building new roads as the best way to provide a last-
ing solution to congestion in the central parts of the
city. Even among parties positive to using road charges
as a demand management policy, the focus of the ar-
gument was somewhat different. Stockholm’s environ-
mental director Gunnar Söderholm notes that “The So-
cial Democrats underlined the air quality improvement
more than congestion (relief), and the Green Party un-
derlined the decrease in congestion more than the air
quality. But this is quite logical. To the Social Democrats,
this was not an alternative to new roads but rather a
complement. But for the Green party themain issue was,
if we can reduce congestion we can avoid new roads,
the present capacity will be enough to handle the traffic.
They wanted to minimize the number of cars, fossil fuel
driven but also the car itself. That was not the case for
the Social Democrats—the car has always been a symbol
of social welfare and economic growth.” (Gunnar Söder-
holm, interview).
The 2002 election campaign was in full swing in
Summer 2002 and the Social Democrats in Stockholm
were eager to regain power from the right-wing coali-
tion, as were their party colleagues at the county and
national levels. Leading Stockholm Social Democrat An-
nika Billström was interested in the potential of conges-
tion charging but advocated postponing implementation
of a congestion charge. During the election campaign of
2002, she swore not to introduce congestion charges dur-
ing the next term if elected. However, directly after the
Social Democrats won the election (local, county, and
national) Billström was more or less ordered to intro-
duce a full-scale charging experiment by her national
government party colleagues. Billström faced a storm
of criticism for having broken her promise and accord-
ing to many of those interviewed, her ability to lead the
city was compromised. On the other hand, it was the
only way for her to form a majority in the city coun-
cil and assume leadership (Bosse Ringholm, interview,
2014). Billström used the opportunity to ask the national
government for co-funding for a congestion charge trial.
She also demanded a secretariat for the “environmental
charge” (Miljöavgiftskansli) to be created directly under
her to manage the trial.
The Social Democrats were after the 2002 elections
the largest party in the national parliament and were
eager to maintain power by forming a multi-party coali-
tion government, but this required the active support
of the Greens, who, with 17 seats, now had swing vote
power. The Green Party representatives demanded a
promise to test a full-scale congestion charging scheme
in Stockholm—comprising (almost) all access roads to
Stockholm but with a strictly defined trial period—noted
by many of those interviewed as critical to its even-
tual success.
The 2002 elections had also given the Greens swing
vote power within the Stockholm City Council and the
County Council. This made local approval of a conges-
tion charging trial essentially unavoidable, even for the
most avid opponents, who nevertheless turned their at-
tention to efforts to delay tactics, including legal appeals
of the many details as part of the decision. In the end,
it was a seven-month trial instead of a multi-year trial.
Much of the legal controversy had to do with whether
or not it was possible to introduce a local fee, which
would require a change to the Swedish Constitution.5
Taxis and other commercial vehicles were exempt from
the tax as were alternatively fueled vehicles—a selling
point for green cars that had such dramatic effect on
sales of ethanol bi-fueled vehicles in particular that it has
4 When the national government finally approved the congestion charging scheme the revenues were (informally) promised (though not formally ear-
marked) for building the western bypass, the part of the road transportation package in which the national government arguably had the strongest
national interest because it facilitated both metro area accessibility as well as national corridors linking Northern and Southern Sweden.
5 Such a change was made seven years later.
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since been revoked to ensure that revenues can remain
high and congestion low.
3.3. The First Trial
To the surprise of many, the chaos predicted by conges-
tion charging opponents did not materialize. On its first
day, the traffic volumes on the gateways to the city de-
creased by 20–25%. Despite the shortened trial period,
the years of planning paid off and the trial itself was rel-
atively smooth. However, issues regarding its form, func-
tion and timing remained unresolved. Tax or fee? Locally
or nationally determined and administered? Who pays,
and to whom would the revenues accrue? How would
they be used? The national government and the parlia-
ment held firm; according to the Swedish Constitution a
congestion charge is a national tax over which the par-
liament has decision-making authority and indeed, did
not have the legal authority to delegate to the govern-
ment or to amunicipality.6 Thismeans that strictly speak-
ing, the Stockholm region canmake no claims on the rev-
enues from the congestion charge. However, all those in-
terviewed reported a common understanding of charge
revenues as financing transportation improvements in
Stockholm. This is strengthened by public statements
from national government politicians noting the tax as
an important national contribution to Stockholm’s trans-
portation infrastructure.
Congestion charging in Stockholm was, however, not
a matter where every party leader could count upon
unanimous support among party members. On the con-
trary, there were deep splits within some parties at the
city and county levels. Interviews (e.g., Bo Malmsten,
Klas Thorén, and Bosse Ringholm) indicate that the So-
cial Democrats at the city level were positive to conges-
tion charges but those in Stockholm’s suburbs were op-
posed. Some of this had to do with actual uncertainty re-
garding effects on economic growth and the distribution
of costs and benefits. Some uncertainty was more tacti-
cal in nature. Would cooperation and compromise with
other parties strengthen their position, or would they
“give away the store” in the process? A similar type of un-
certainty had to dowith signals between the local and na-
tional levels.Would an acceptance of congestion charges
free up additional resources for Stockholm’s road infras-
tructure, or give the national government an excuse to re-
duce the annual transportation subsidy—essentially us-
ing the congestion charging revenues for other national
priorities? Interviews, as well as reviews of public state-
ments during the 2002–2007 period indicate that many
political leaders were attempting to both calm their base
constituencies (that may or may not want the tax, or
may or may not want revenues from the tax to facilitate
the approval of new motorways) but also leave the door
open for compromises with other parties and other po-
litical levels.
3.4. A Political Gamble: The Referendum in Stockholm
The move from mandated large-scale experiment to po-
tentially permanent national tax was bound up with
promises from both the national and local governments
to hold a local referendum on the issue of a congestion
tax.7 In the City Hall, the Moderates and Liberals were
opposed to the congestion tax and found popular sup-
port against road charges in any form. Annika Billström
(Commissioner of Finance) and the rest of the city lead-
ership, including representatives of the Green party, ac-
cepted the idea of holding a referendum, but not the tim-
ing. They decided that the referendumwould not be held
until Stockholm had the benefit of experiencing a full-
scale experiment. The referendum was therefore held
simultaneously with the general election in 2006. Bill-
ström promised that although the referendum was for-
mally still only advisory, the city would respect the deci-
sion of the electorate—within the City borders.
This proved important in several respects and pro-
vides a clue to the aspects of leadership in Stockholm
that may be essential to understanding this case. Agree-
ing to respect the results of a referendum was politically
risky—polls at the time showed that a majority of Stock-
holmers were clearly against the charge.8 Nevertheless,
Billström reasoned that agreeing to a referendum would
dampen the powerful criticism she was subject to from
other parties, from the press and indeed from some of
her own constituency. She had been compelled to break
a promise to wait with a full-scale test—but now de-
manded that a referendum be held once the voters had
a clear sense of how it affected them, both positively and
negatively. This also gave transportation planners and
administrators time to focus on the immediate improve-
ments that could be made in other areas, such as signifi-
cantly expanded bus service and new subway cars—that
showed that voters were “getting something” from the
charge—even if this was strictly speaking not the case.
So, promising to hold a referendum was relatively un-
problematic, and promising to follow its result was risky
but could effectively counteract arguments that she was
unresponsive to her constituency. Only the results of the
referendum held in the municipality of Stockholm would
count. Results from surrounding communities would be
considered, but not allowed to determine what the City
of Stockholmwould propose to the national government
and parliament to make the charge permanent.
6 This paragraph of the Constitution has since been modified. Since 2011, the Swedish parliament may delegate such decisions to the government or to
a municipality but it is stated that such a delegation right should be used restrictively.
7 Referenda have always been advisory, i.e. non-binding, in Sweden. If a minimum of 5% of eligible voters demand a referendum, local governments are
compelled to administer it.
8 Polls taken when the congestion charge trial had been announced, but was not yet underway, showed 52% percent in favor in late 2004, but only 43%
by late 2005. However, towards the end of the trial public support had increased to 54%, a remarkable shift that underscores the importance of helping
users experience actual effects of such a policy (Hårsman & Quigley, 2010).
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Figure 1. The congestion charge zone and electronic payment gateways. Many gateways have several hundred years of
history as tolled entry points for goods into the city. It is also no accident that all of the actual charging points (including
the physical infrastructure itself) are on Stockholm City land. To site gateways in other municipalities would have required
negotiating land use rights with additional communities and it was feared that surrounding municipalities could use land
use monopoly power to block the trial (Hårsman & Quigley, 2010; Swedish Road Administration, 2005).
The gamble paid off. The referendum in Stockholm
showed a clear majority in favor of continued congestion
taxes, with support strongest in the inner city. Perhaps
predictably, among those in the surrounding communi-
ties that held a vote, a clear majority remained against.
Yet because the decision whether or not to move for-
ward was contingent on the municipality vote, these re-
sults did not undermine the mayor’s efforts to move for-
ward with congestion charging. This is not to say that
the negative results of the referendum outside the city
were inconsequential. Not too long after the referendum,
the 2006 election put the right bloc9 back in power—
in the parliament, the county council and in Stockholm
with enough of a majority that they could build a coali-
tion government without the Green Party. The left bloc
had won the referendum regarding congestion charging,
but lost its seats at all levels of government. Whether or
not this was related to congestion charging more than
other electoral issues is hard to say, but as a single-issue,
the political impact of prior support for or opposition
to congestion charging was not entirely obvious with re-
spect to the newly established electoral power balance.
As suggested by Hårsman and Quigley (2010) the cau-
sation goes in two directions: those with strong opin-
ions about congestion charging might have voted for a
party sharing their opinion and those having strong pref-
erences for a political party may have disregarded their
opinion about the charging system.
The City Council´s new Moderate majority leader-
ship was now faced with a tricky situation, described by
party colleague Carl Cederschiöld this way: “the voters
gave the right bloc a clear majority; and although the
moderates and liberals (Folkpartiet) were clearly against
the congestion tax, they now had control of the city
hall. At the same time, while Stockholmers voted 54%
for the congestion charge, 80% of the people that had
voted in surrounding communities were against.10 Fur-
thermore, within the alliance (Moderates, Liberals, Chris-
tian Democrats, Center) we had a split, the Center party
wanted the tax. We needed to unravel that knot, so we
came up with a clever solution. We four parties wrote
a guest editorial in DN (Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm’s
9 Moderate, Liberal, Center and Christian Democratic parties.
10This is important because the local, regional and national representatives of the same parties were not necessarily in agreement and neither were
those that voted for them.
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largest daily newspaper) about a week before we were
scheduled to assume governance of the city and an-
nounced that there would be a permanent congestion
tax from July 1 2007. We had to do it before we assumed
power, we had to pre-empt the discussion before it com-
pletely got out of hand.”
The text to which Cederschiöld is referring (Reinfeldt,
Olofsson, Leijonborg, & Hägglund, 2006) was an impor-
tant strategic move for the incoming coalition govern-
ment. First of all, the editorial was signed by the lead-
ers of the four parties that called themselves the “al-
liance” at the national level: incoming prime minister
Fredrik Reinfeldt, (Moderate), Maud Olofsson (Center),
Lars Leijonborg (Liberal Folkpartiet) and Göran Hägglund
(Christian Democrat). This is an example of the impor-
tance of ongoing communication among party members
at the local, regional and national levels. It is also a clear
signal from the new national government that they in-
tended to set the agenda for future decisions regard-
ing congestion charging in Stockholm rather than facil-
itating an independent local decision, notwithstanding
the reference to a future decentralization of charging au-
thority to local or regional authorities.11 Perhaps even
more importantly, the alliance parties re-coupled the
congestion charging issue with decisions regarding other
major transportation investments, announcing that con-
gestion taxes would be introduced as part of a major
transportation policy package negotiated between the
local, regional and national levels. This put the western
bypass back on the bargaining table, opening negotia-
tion space with more auto-dependent communities sur-
rounding Stockholm for the incoming minister of finance
Anders Borg. With one stroke congestion taxes were po-
sitioned as a funding mechanism for new roads, the so-
lution with which the right bloc (and the Moderates in
particular) had always been most comfortable with. And
with this compromise, congestion charging had moved
beyond its pilot status into the realm of reality, promoted
and institutionalized now by some of the very same po-
litical forces that had raised questions about its appropri-
ateness under previous Mayor Billström.
3.5. Congestion Charges to Fund Subways—And
Facilitate Housing
The discussion about using congestion taxes to fund a
range of transport infrastructures made sense to a wide
range of political actors, given that Stockholm’s popu-
lation growth had continued unabated since 1981. By
the mid-2000’s, Stockholm’s labor and housing market
had outgrown both city and county administrative limits;
while economic growth has been even more rapid than
population growth, notwithstanding economic down-
turns and the global economic crisis. Given its expansion,
Figure 2. Results from the Stockholm referendum on congestion charging in 2006, 52% for and 48% against. Note: City of
Stockholm residents only; charging cordon noted as a dotted line. “No” districts noted in the darker shade. Those within
the cordon were in general far more favorable to the charge than those outside the cordon. Roughly half of the revenues
come from residents within the cordon (Hårsman & Quigley, 2010).
10 As of 2017 this has not transpired although several respondents argue that it is “understood” that revenues should in some way remit to the
Stockholm region.
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many were arguing that Scandinavia’s largest city could
position itself as a successful model for a European capi-
tal city built on innovation, sustainable growth and diver-
sity. This was an argument dear tomany in the right-wing
bloc. But it would be hard to realize such aims without
public investments to facilitate such goals. Among the
greatest barriers, as described in a number of reports, in-
cluding OECD Territorial Review for Stockholm (Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment, 1999),
were those related to housing and transport.
The housing market had both too low a rate of new
buildings and a range of institutional factors hindering
turnover. The structural problems affecting Stockholm’s
housing market included the effects of continued rent
control policies, tax policies affecting turnover, and low
rates of new developments were often attributed to con-
fusing national laws and sometimes local policies. A num-
ber of improvements had long been proposed by interest
groups and opinion leaders, and there had been some re-
forms to housing policy and regulation, but many were
seen as too politically charged and had not yet been
implemented. In the post-2006 electoral environment,
however, Moderates saw an opportunity to put these
issues back on the agenda when considering whether
to proceed with congestion charging, using these issues
to widen their coalition of support. By highlighting the
importance of explicitly linking extensions of the sub-
way to new housing developments in station areas, ad-
vocates of transportation expansion were able to pro-
duce broad approval across political blocs in the parlia-
ment, county council, and municipalities for more force-
ful action.12 The Moderate Party was, as noted above, in
favor of using revenues from congestion charging taxes
for building newmotorways, but now they changed their
strategy. The national government negotiated an agree-
ment regarding both housing and subway extensions in-
cluding the division of responsibility and regulatory au-
thority among the national government, County Coun-
cil and municipalities (Stockholmsförhandlingen, 2007).
Since that agreement, the congestion charge revenues
have increased, due partly to higher charges and partly
to the inclusion of additional crossings (Swedish Trans-
port Agency, 2016).
About half of the additional revenues generated from
the expanded and raised congestion charges will fund
the new subway expansion. The Stockholm County Coun-
cil will build nine new subway stations and associated
rail infrastructure in Stockholm and three neighboring
municipalities (Järfälla, Nacka and Solna) during the pe-
riod 2018–2025. Stockholm and these three municipali-
ties promise that 78,000 new apartments will be built in
the station areas (either by municipally owned develop-
ment companies or by private developers) over a 16-year
period. This is roughly twice the number of new apart-
ments built in the entire region in past six years; in other
words, it is a major breakthrough in the seemingly in-
tractable “chicken and egg” problem plaguing the build-
ing of new transport infrastructure (in hope that housing
will be built) and new housing (in hope that transport in-
frastructure will be built).
To the extent that congestion charge revenues are re-
garded as national level contributions to Stockholm’s in-
frastructure (the charges legally are national taxes), the
national level is thus contributing about 70 percent of
the cost for the subway extensions and the county coun-
cil and municipalities for the balance of the capital costs
plus some marginal costs for new subway cars and as-
sociated infrastructure. If we instead regard congestion
charges as a regional contribution (aggregated from in-
dividual contributions of which roughly half are Stock-
holmers and half from the rest of the region), then the
proportion of national/local financing is basically the op-
posite. But either way, the point is that congestion charg-
ing is far from a localized policy whose impacts are felt
only by Stockholm residents or those driving into the city.
Rather, congestion charging has become a transport pol-
icy initiative capable of uniting multiple scales of gover-
nance around a range of spatial planning and sustainabil-
ity aims.
4. Insights from the Stockholm Congestion Charging
Experience
Building onMetzger and Rader Olsson’s account of Stock-
holm’s experience with sustainable urban development
over the past century (2013), we argue that the contri-
butions of congestion charging to larger urban sustain-
ability goals are the result of critical decisions that laid
the pathway for addressing a wide range of infrastruc-
ture concerns, ultimately leading to the successful adop-
tion of congestion charging and to a more robust plan-
ning process capable of integrating multiple sustainabil-
ity aims.
4.1. Linking the What and the Why to Build Support
Information and awareness-building about sustainabil-
ity is important, but this case has suggested that such
goals must be supported by concrete interventions that
directly impact everyday life in the city. Likewise, action
without awareness-building can fail if those affected do
not understand their purpose. The congestion charging
policy in Stockholm tests this hypothesis and suggests a
slightly modified formulation, building on recognition of
the ways that initial transport policy discussions estab-
lished strong political positions that ultimately created
limits as well as opportunities for consensus.
The idea of road charges in some form had been eval-
uated, packaged, spun, wrangled and debated by all par-
ties, in Stockholm and at the regional and national levels.
Repeatedly, congestion charging failed to win support as
purely a revenue source for motorways, or as a demand
12 This is essentially a reaffirmation of the principles of the 1952 City plan and the regional plans that followed it. Even the routes of the proposed subway
extensions are essentially inspired from proposals and arguments in the 1965 Subway plan, which were not implemented.
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management measure. Eliasson (2014) argues that the
reframing of congestion pricing as an environmental pol-
icy was important to its eventual political and public ac-
ceptance. We support this idea but propose that it was
a rather longer and more complex process of coupling,
decoupling and re-coupling congestion charges with a
range of goals such as environmental protection, rev-
enue generation, and even solving acute housing short-
ages that finally succeeded in breaking political logjams
and building local support. A potential consequence of
this strategy was that over time, identically articulated
congestion charge policies could become different things
to different constituencies. This allowed competing inter-
ests to agree on one policy but for varied reasons.
For example, the Stockholm Party (locally) and the
Green party (nationally, later also locally) chose the sin-
gle issue of a congestion charging trial as their condition
for support and used this to court both the left and the
right from themiddle. They found a vacuum in local (and
later national) politics that could be called “environmen-
tal urbanists.” In contrast to the “greenwave” of decades
earlier that equated environmental ideology with living
off the land and eschewing capitalism, these new urban-
ists celebrated the city. The Stockholm Party was focused
on both the natural environment and the built environ-
ment, and chose niche issues that appealed to the new
urban professionals. They attracted voters from the right
bloc that weremarket oriented but wantedmore explicit
focus on the natural environment, and from the left bloc
that were interested in exploring the potential of pri-
vatization, support for small businesses and innovation
as sustainable development strategies. The Green and
Stockholm parties led by cleverly decoupling and recou-
pling issues. They found a new party platform that ap-
pealed to a growing niche in Stockholm’s electorate, the
environmentally aware urbanite. They decoupled con-
gestion charging from the grandiose and highly interde-
pendent giant transport packages that were moving two
steps forward and one step back. They also recognized
that their ultimatum should be the demand for a conges-
tion charging trial, full scale but limited, and followed by
a public referendum (Romson notes that a 7-month full
scale trial was seen as an absolute minimum and that it
was important that she rejected a last-minute proposal
to limit the trial to only a few parts of the city).
The Green Party (which by the end of the trial had
more or less incorporated what was left of the Stock-
holm Party) hoped that demonstrating that congestion
chargeswould provide lasting congestion reductionwith-
out jeopardizing continued economic growth would fi-
nally take the motorway plans off the table. Instead, the
othermajor parties set out to “recouple” the increasingly
accepted charging scheme back to their old priorities.
The right bloc’s pre-emptive strike following the 2006
elections, accepting the charges but firmly repositioning
them as a funding source for the new roads seems to
have been effective. The fact that the national govern-
ment and Stockholm’s municipalities are now using the
opportunity to finally make concrete plans for new hous-
ing is testament to the importance of re-coupling the con-
gestion charges to development plans for public and pri-
vate transport, housing and accessibility.
This continuing reframing of the “what and why” of
congestion charging may hold lessons for approaching
sustainability policy in other cities. The inclusion of road
charges in the Dennis package negotiations was an im-
portant strategy to build support for a comprehensive
transportation package, because it allowed diverse po-
litical constituencies to agree on the same package for
different reasons. However, it may have also had the ef-
fect of reinforcing the idea that road charges (including
congestion charges) are a transportation investment and
demandmanagement policy as opposed to a sustainable
urban development policy. When considered primarily a
transportation policy, road/congestion charges are nego-
tiated in relation to other transportation priorities, and
local and regional authorities that lack the resources for
large capital transportation infrastructure investments
are in a difficult negotiating position with powerful na-
tional authorities. But when congestion charging is im-
bued with a dual revenue generation/demand manage-
ment role, linked more strongly to urban sustainability
goals and in particular to housing provision, policy space
is opened for more balanced negotiation between the
local and national levels. Congestion charging linked not
only the “what” and the “why” more clearly, but also
the “who”.
4.2. Build consensus or forge ahead?
MarquisW. Childs’ book Sweden: TheMiddleWay (1936)
characterized Swedish politics has been as focused on co-
operation and compromise across party lines or as prag-
matic and driven by common sense or an engineering
attitude to problem-solving. Childs has many followers
that underscore the Swedish capacity for consensus and
compromise (See e.g., Möller, 2011; Kelman, 2012). The
political culture of consensus-seeking and pragmatism
has never meant an absence of political differences and
political fights. However, fights have more often than
not resulted in going “back to the drawing board” for
further evaluations and have eventually led to compro-
mises rather than stalemates blocking further actions.
Broad consensus can lead to “watered down” sustain-
ability policies that are ineffective as tools for change. In
the congestion charging case, however, Stockholm man-
aged to make bold policy and investment decisions with-
out losing sight of the need for compromise and at least
some kind of consensus—at least regarding the attrac-
tiveness of congestion charges, albeit with different mo-
tives and revenue priorities.
Earlier studies of Stockholm’s congestion charging ex-
perience have suggested that the acceptance of conges-
tion charges can be explained at least in part by the city’s
high share of public transport users, with median voters
in favor of congestion charges due to their potential to
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benefit transit and reduce urban congestion (Armelius
& Hultkrantz, 2006). However, this does not explain why
charges were not imposed far earlier. It may be argued
that willingness over time to bundle congestion charges
with transportation investments that would appeal to in-
ner city transit users as well as regional motorists (in par-
ticular by funding the western bypass) demonstrates the
importance of compromise and of compensating “los-
ing” constituencies.13 This is logical, but does not explain
the political courage to announce the full-scale pilot be-
fore determining exactlywhere revenueswould be spent.
This may illustrate the importance of timing open and
closed negotiations; an open announcement of the con-
gestion charge pilot, with simultaneous closed discus-
sions regarding revenues andmore comprehensive trans-
portation investment packages.
It is difficult to attribute innovative transport deci-
sions to an individual or a single organization or party;
rather, this case reflects the contribution of key individu-
als—leaders—in achieving support their proposals in the
City Council and the national parliament respectively in a
specific economic, social and political context. Through-
out the process they also needed to convince influen-
tial subordinate authorities and associated bureaucrats,
and these processes were time-consuming and demand-
ing. Effective leaders had ambitious and visionary goals
but also remarkable patience and tenacity. By contrast,
when leading politicians and parties sought to force deci-
sions, disable the opposition or set ultimatums theywere
either typically sent “back to the drawing board” to be re-
evaluated, discussed again, tested, and—in the case of
the congestion charge—re-legitimized by a popular vote.
From studying these differences and the processes
that preceded them, we can conclude with some other
additional takeaways on the subject of political strategies
and tactics necessary to achieve policy success:
• Open and closed negotiations are both useful, but
the order of these matters. From this case study,
it appears that starting with an open discussion to
build consensus and public support and then mov-
ing to a closed negotiation to negotiate specific
terms can be effective;
• Setting limits on the scope of the negotiation is
key. Without limits or trade-offs from the outset,
the negotiations run the risk of spiraling out of
control. Some of these imposed limits might in-
clude Elections or electoral timing, Legislation, Fi-
nances, Early commitment to other infrastructure
projects, and Physical realities (i.e. Stockholm be-
ing surrounded by water);
• Perseverance through periods of uncertainty and
divergent opinions is as or more important as per-
severance during times of cooperation. Conflict is
just as important as consensus, and both are to be
expected in an effective negotiation;
• Language is key in building political support. Call-
ing the congestion tax a toll was much less favor-
able, and the phrasing of the referenda in the sur-
rounding municipalities likely affected how it was
perceived. In addition, continuity in language can
be similarly important (e.g. the use of the words
“negotiation” and “package”);
• Piloting or other large-scale experiments can re-
duce uncertainty regarding effects and therefore
allow policymakers to craft compensatory policies
within the context of political negotiations.
In policy circles, decisions are often made based on ex-
pectations that both physical infrastructure and policy
commitmentwill endure. This is critical in helping individ-
uals evaluate the costs and benefits of a particular policy.
However, the long-term impacts of novel, as-yet unreal-
ized policies may be difficult to gauge. This case shows
that the city’s “full scale experiment” in congestion charg-
ing, built on a pilot tested at a scale large enough to re-
duce various types of uncertainty and build acceptance,
but small enough to be dismantled if proven ineffective,
was a key determinant of policy success. The conges-
tion charging pilot led to a dramatic reversal of public
opinion from strongly negative to positive. It anticipated
broader applications of policy and expansions, but took
an incremental approach. Congestion charging is now
an accepted part of the policy portfolio in Stockholm;
it remains to be seen if it will be as successful in other
Swedish areas. This follows Eliasson (2014) but adds the
idea that the individual experience of voters related to
public acceptance is not identical to the political experi-
ence of politicians experimenting with various policy in-
carnations over time and in changing political contexts.
But in this case, the positive experience of voters helped
change the policy calculation of politicians, thus leading
to widespread embrace of congestion charging.
5. Conclusions
Although the congestion charging decision played out in
a distinctively Swedish context, it involved a complex pro-
cess of reframing both the problem of congestion and
the aims of transport policy in ways that required strate-
gic diplomacy and tactical mediation. Only when it was
recast as simultaneously a traffic restriction and a rev-
enue generation measure did it become widely recog-
nized as addressing the concerns ofmultiple and compet-
ing constituencies, thus breaking the long-standing polit-
ical impasse.
13 It may be worth noting that another argument for building the western bypass was to reduce the isolation of the rich north and less wealthy southern
parts of the metro region (a long-standing priority for the left leaning parties) and help working families access jobs, schools and local services. It bears
underscoring that the working class, generally a strong share of the left bloc’s constituency, have in recent decades moved further and further out in
the Stockholm region as the processes of gentrification in Stockholm and the near suburbs proceeded. For many residents within the City of Stockholm,
the idea of charging the cars coming into the city so as to reduce inner city congestion was attractive, not least if revenues could be used to improve
public transportation (either directly, or as a result of not having to use as high a share of national transport allocations for roads).
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Through the introduction of congestion charging,
Stockholmhas experiencedmajor transformations in rev-
enue/financing sources, institutions and the institution-
alization of the housing-transport nexus, communication
and coordination between the different levels of govern-
ment, and a certain willingness on the part of both politi-
cians and citizens to make sacrifices on behalf of overall
sustainability goals. Just as importantly, the policy’s suc-
cesses have produced a transformation in the ways that
transportation policies are nowbeing perceived, far from
being seen solely as an enabler of mobility they are now
also viewed as a complement to housing (i.e. a mode of
infrastructural servicing) and a basis for an integrated re-
gional planning system, the latter of which is perceived
as crucial to the achievement of larger urban and na-
tional development aims. Likewise, the intensified focus
on dense urban living in Stockholm has been made pos-
sible by congestion charging, but is also now connected
to many other agendas, including economic competitive-
ness and environmental sustainability. The process fol-
lowed to arrive at this outcomewasmarked by successes
and failures, not to mention conflict and consensus, all
revolving around congestion pricing as a policy as well as
over who would get political “credit” for introducing or
rejecting this policy.
If we accept that the process is as important as the
outcome, knowing exactly which process to follow to
keep the idea of congestion charging alive, knowing at
what point in time a new framing is necessary, and under-
standingwhich organizational or political tactics will help
achieve both, will be critical to sustainability outcomes.
One might say that after decades of struggle, there is
now enhanced planning capacity to have a healthy con-
versation about urban sustainability in Stockholm, includ-
ing but certainly not limited to the role of transportation.
Hands-down, the capacity to leverage multiple sustain-
ability goals must be considered one of the most impor-
tant contributions of congestion charging to the field of
urban planning, and the reason that other cities should
take it seriously.
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